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THE DISCLOSURE AND REPRODUCTION OF
COPYRIGHTED AGENCY RECORDS UNDER THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the passage of the Freedom of Information Act'
(FOIA) in 1966, the FOIA's emphasis on governmental open-
ness and disclosure of agency processes through access to
agency records has been in constant struggle with opposing
forces, both from within the government and without. This
struggle2 has been focused primarily on the nine exemptions
found in the Act.3 The exemptions provide guidance to courts
in determining the legality of withholding government docu-
ments from public scrutiny.
The Copyright Act of 1976" also has been a battleground
of competing interests and public policies.' The Copyright Act
protects the expression of ideas from unauthorized exploita-
tion. Like the FOIA, the major controversies under the Copy-
right Act have focused on one part of the statute, section 107,1
commonly referred to as the fair use doctrine.7 Under that
0 1982 by Roy Seth Gordet
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
2. A FOIA lawsuit typically arises when a party requesting an agency record is
thwarted by the agency's refusal to release the information. The party then sues in a
federal district court to compel disclosure.
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976). The nine exemptions to full government disclosure
of agency records, in capsule form, are:
1) National security;
2) Agency personnel practices;
3) Special statutes;
4) Trade secrets and confidential business information;
5) Inter-intra agency memoranda;
6) Personnel and medical files;
7) Law enforcement investigatory records;
8) Data regarding financial institutions;
9) Geophysical data regarding gas and oil wells.
4. 17 U.S.C. App. § 101 (1976 & Supp III 1979).
5. Congressional hearings on revising the copyright laws have been conducted
continuously since 1955.
6. 17 U.S.C. App. § 107 (1976).
7. Section 107 provides:
[iun determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case
is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include
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doctrine, one who reproduces all or part of a work does not
infringe upon a copyright if his reproduction is minimal or his
motives noncommercial. Section 108' expands upon section
107 by establishing special applications of the doctrine in li-
brary settings.
In Weisberg v. United States Department of Justice9 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia examined the
interaction between the FOIA and the Copyright Act of 1976.
The issue before the court was "whether administrative
materials copyrighted by private parties are subject to the dis-
closure provisions of the FOIA."10 The court held that the ex-
istence of a copyright does not automatically render FOIA in-
applicable to agency records.11 In Weisberg the government
argued that the court could also exempt these agency records
from the FOIA under the exemption for trade secrets and
confidential business information."2 Under the current frame-
work of the FOIA, any exemption for agency records clearly
must fall under exemption three: exemption by specific lan-
guage in a separate federal statute. Also apparent is that
copyright issues similar to that in Weisberg must be resolved
under the FOIA framework. No precedent exists for defining
copyright as either confidential business information or a
trade secret. Therefore, only exemption three can conceivably
prevent disclosure in the face of FOIA mandates.
This comment demonstrates that the existence of a copy-
right cannot, of its own accord, be an effective reason for non-
disclosure. Rather, subject to the delicate economic forces un-
derlying the fair use doctrine, the government's position vis-a-
vis copyrighted documents must adjust accordingly when
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. App. § 107 (1976).
8. 17 U.S.C. App. § 108 (1976).
9. 631 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
10. Id. at 825.
11. Id.
12. The government had argued that both exemption three and four prevented
disclosure. Id. See also, Brief for Appellant at 39-43, Weisberg v. United States Dep't.
of Justice, 631 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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those documents form part of a government information sys-
tem like the one mandated by the FOIA." An ever-increasing
flow of documents and information will complicate any such
adjustment. Regulating information technology such as com-
puters and data processing, provides the best opportunity for
Congress to deal effectively with the problem. These new so-
lutions can be incorporated into new, more comprehensive
legislation.
The complex confrontation of law and policies in Weis-
berg requires the consideration of the larger problems under-
lying the development and dissemination of information in
both the public and private spheres. This comment explores
the interaction of the Copyright Act's fair use doctrine with
the amended exemption three of the FOIA. The comment
concludes with a discussion of the current proposals for maxi-
mizing the efficiency of government information systems", and
suggests an alternative solution.
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF EXEMPTION THREE
A. The Language of the Exemption
Exemption three states that the FOIA does not require
disclosure of matters that are: "specifically exempted from
disclosure by statute, . . . provided that such statute (A) re-
quires that the matter be withheld from the public in such a
manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) estab-
lishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular
types of matters to be withheld .. " As discussed below a
statute can qualify for the exemption in three distinct ways.
Exemption three differs from the other exemptions in that it
does not specify the documents that may be withheld. It re-
fers instead to documents that are already exempted by other
13. Possibly, in the future the copyrighted documents will be treated under ex-
emption four, for trade secrets and confidential business information, or under an
exemption four-type approach.
In addition, the copyright statute could be amended to more effectively take ac-
count of economic variables, and thereby be considered commercial information
which would be evaluated under exemption four. See infra note 102.
14. The Copyright Act's relation to the FOIA will provide a special perspective
from which to view such systems.
15. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976).
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statutes.1 6
In Federal Aviation Administration v. Robertson,1 7 the
United States Supreme Court applied the less-exacting lan-
guage of the original exemption three"8 to a statute that
granted an agency broad discretion to withhold documents.
Public interest lawyers requested that the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) make available Systems Worthiness
Analysis Program Reports which consisted of the FAA's anal-
yses of the operation and maintenance performance of com-
mercial airlines. 9 Section 1104 of the Federal Aviation Act 2 0
permits the FAA Administrator, upon receiving an objection
to public disclosures of information in a report, to withhold
disclosure when it would adversely affect the objecting party's
interest and it would not be in the public's interest.2 ' There-
fore, the Court permitted the FAA to withhold the docu-
ments. Congress viewed the Court's interpretation in Robert-
son as giving an agency "'cart blanch' [sic] to withhold any
information [it] pleases.""2 Congress amended exemption
three to preserve the vitality of the FOIA's original purpose of
promoting full governmental disclosure. The effect of the 1976
amendment was to overturn Robertson. The Supreme Court
has only interpreted exemption three twice since the 1976
amendment. 8 Nevertheless, lower courts have frequently ap-
plied the exemption to a wide range of statutes.2 4
16. Note, The Effect of the 1976 Amendment to Exemption Three of the Free-
dom of Information Act, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1029 (1976). The author refers to such
statutes as "pre-existing nondisclosure statutes" because statutes drafted after the
FOIA will probably be drafted in a way that will take the FOIA into consideration.
Id. at 1029 n.5.
17. 422 U.S. 255 (1975).
18. Exemption three originally referred to matters that were "specifically ex-
empted by statute" without any further requirement. 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3) (1970)
(amended 1976).
19. 422 U.S. at 257.
20. 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
21. 422 U.S. at 258 n.4.
22. H.R. REP. No. 880, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1976). See Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 121 n.18 (1980); American Jew-
ish Congress v. Kreps, 574 F.2d 624, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Note, supra note 16, at
1042 n.76 (providing a detailed summary of the gradual modification of exemption
three by Congress).
23. The cases were related. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 447 U.S. 102 (1980); GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the United
States, 445 U.S. 375 (1980).
24. See Plesser & Halperin, Information Exempted by Other Statutes, in THE
1981 EDITON op LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND
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B. Three Representative Case Studies
Three cases exemplify the judicial approaches to exemp-
tion three. The first, American Jewish Congress v. Kreps,25
contains a thorough analysis of a particular statute in the ex-
emption three context.2  The plaintiff in Weisberg relied ex-
tensively on American Jewish Congress to support his conten-
tion that the Copyright Act is not an exemption three
statute.2 7 The statute at issue in American Jewish Congress
was the Export Administration Act of 1969 (EAA).' 8 The EAA
endows the Secretary of Commerce with the broad power to
impose export controls in pursuit of specified objectives. One
such objective is to discourage American exporters from par-
ticipating in certain boycotts that would restrict American
foreign trade. The Secretary has the option to withhold any
information he obtains in enforcing the Act if he considers it
in the public interest to do so. When the American Jewish
Congress sought access to boycott-request reports received by
exporters from foreign governments, it was denied access and
brought suit. Referring to legislative history, the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia asserted that subsection A
of exemption three was intended to include only "those stat-
utes incorporating a congressional mandate of confidentiality
that, however general, is 'absolute and without exception.' ,,29
The court also pointed out that, in contrast, subsection B al-
lows some administrative discretion in two carefully defined
situations.8 0 The underlying thrust of both subsections is to
"assure that basic policy decisions on government secrecy be
made by the Legislative rather than the Executive branch.'"al
Applying these standards to section 7(c) of the EAA82 the
court held that the "determination of whether 'the withhold-
ing of the information' is contrary to the national interest
PRIVAcY ACT (C. Marwick ed. 1981); [hereinafter 1981 FOIA LrIGATION] Annot., 47
A.L.R. 3d 439 (1980).
25. 574 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
26. Plesser & Halperin, supra note 24, at 47.
27. Brief for Appellee at 38-39, Weisberg v. United States Dep't of Justice, 631
F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
28. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401 (1976) (expired Sept. 30, 1979).
29. 574 F.2d at 628.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(c) (1976) (expired Sept. 30, 1979).
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should not rest in an administrator." 3 The court also found
that the EAA would not qualify under subsection B because
of the lack of specificity of the subject matter."' As a result,
plaintiffs were permitted access to the documents in question.
The administrator's sense of "public interest," by itself, was
deemed an insufficient ground in light of the other requisites
of exemption three. The courts, rather than the administrator,
should determine the public interest."
In contrast, in Iron & Sears v. Dann," the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia found that despite the pres-
ence of some "residual administrative discretion, section
122 of the Patent Act 8 would not lead to an abuse of agency
discretion that could result in nondisclosure in situations
where Congress intended disclosure.3 " In Dann, the appellant
sought access under the FOIA to all decisions of the Patent
and Trademark Office that disposed of requests by would-be
patentees desiring a filing date earlier than the one initially
assigned to their applications. 40 The court referred to Con-
gressional intent in enumerating certain characteristics of the
Patent Act that required nondisclosure: (1) affirmative re-
quirement of nondisclosure, (2) specificity of material, (3) a
narrow "special circumstances exception," (4) no previous
general access to the materials, and (5) potential disruption of
the statutory scheme. 1
The court applied these standards to the three classifica-
tions of patent applications. It held that documents are ex-
empt from the FOIA if they relate to pending and abandoned
applications, but they are fully subject to the Act if they re-
late to applications that have been issued as patents.4 2 The
court's willingness to draw these "procedural" distinctions
33. 574 F.2d at 630. The court noted that a "central aim of the FOIA has been
to substitute legislative judgment for administrative discretion." Id. at 628.
34. Id. at 630-31.
35. Unfortunately, the individual administrator often determines the "public
interest" for the purpose of granting a fee waiver. Bonine, Public Interest Fee Waiv-
ers Under the Freedom of Information Act, 1981 DUKE L.J. 213.
36. 606 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1975 (1979).
37. Id. at 1220.
38. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1976).
39. 606 F.2d at 1220.
40. Id. at 1218. The court divided applications into three categories: pending,
terminated without issuance, and issued.
41. Id. at 1221.
42. Id. at 1222.
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among the patent applications significantly influenced the
court's decision on the status of the application under the
FOIA. The Patent Act is analogous to the Copyright Act in
that both copyrights and patents are forms of intellectual
property. Such an approach could be applied in a modified
form to the copyright situation.
The third case, Consumer Product Safety Commission v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc.," was handed down after the Weisberg
decision. The United States Supreme Court scrutinized sec-
tion 6(b)(1) of the Consumer Product Safety Act"4 (CPSA)
and considered whether section 6(b)(1) prevents the disclo-
sure of accident reports by the Consumer Product Safety
Commission pursuant to a request under the FOIA. That sec-
tion requires the Consumer Product Safety Commission to no-
tify a manufacturer at least thirty days before the public dis-
closure of information pertaining to a manufacturer's product
if it is to be described in a way that would enable the public
to identify the manufacturer.
The Commission argued that section 6(b)(1) was not in-
tended to apply to FOIA requests, but instead applied only to
Commission-initiated public disclosures such as press releases
or news conferences. The Commission argued that when infor-
mation is released on its own initiative, the Commission im-
plicitly represents that it believes the disclosed information is
valid.4 5 On the other hand, when the Commission releases in-
formation in response to a FOIA request, the Commission is
obliged to release whatever materials it possesses and need
not comply with section 6(b)(1) because it is not vouching for
the integrity of the released information."6
The Court rejected that argument and found that section
6(b)(1), by its own terms, applies to the "public disclosure of
any information.' 47 Since "sufficiently definite standards" are
established by the statute, the Court held that section 6(b)(1)
falls within the scope of exemption three.48 The Court deter-
mined that section 6(b)(1) did not grant the Commission
43. 447 U.S. 102 (1980). See also Note, Developments Under the Freedom of
Information Act-1979, 1980 DuKE L.J. 139, 149-53.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(1) (1976).
45. 447 U.S. at 108.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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overly broad discretion to refuse to comply with FOIA re-
quests. Insufficiently definite standards would have denied
section 6(b)(1) classification as a statute falling within the pa-
rameters of exemption three. According to the Court, section
6(b)(1) "requires that the Commission 'take reasonable steps
to assure' (1) that the information is 'accurate,' (2) that dis-
closure will be 'fair in the circumstances,' and (3) that disclo-
sure will be 'reasonably related to effectuating the purposes of
the CPSA.' "49
The Commission had claimed that fulfilling the section
6(b)(1) requirements for all FOIA requests would lead to "in-
surmountable burdens."80 The Court found that in enacting
section 6(b)(1) Congress intended to balance consumer inter-
est with the need for fairness and accuracy in the Commis-
sion's information disclosure practices. 1 The Court concluded
that no "insoluble conflict" existed between section 6(b)(1)
and the FOIA.
The courts emphasize the importance of the wording of
the third exemption in strictly applying the exemption to
statutes which potentially prevent disclosure. In addition, the
legislative history of both the FOIA and the amendment to
exemption three appear to require that an exempting statute
"manifest a firm commitment to secrecy"" before it can be
used to prevent disclosure of agency records. The Supreme
Court's recent decision in Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion v. GTE Sylvania may herald the erosion of this "commit-
ment to secrecy."
C. Copyright Act is Not an Exemption Three Stat-
ute-Weisberg v. United States
The Copyright Act of 1976 attempted to modernize the
copyright scheme in order to facilitate its application in a so-
ciety with rapidly evolving means of communication." Cable
49. Id.
50. Id. at 123.
51. Id. at 123-24. In this case strict interpretation of a statute actually coin-
cided with what the court determined to be the underlying policy issues.
52. Note, supra note 16, at 1046. Although written before any of the judicial
analysis surveyed in this comment, the commentator's conclusion has been subse-
quently verified by the courts. See, e.g., American Jewish Congress v. Kreps, 574 F.2d
624 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
53. The initial aim of the new statute was to codify and rationalize. Political
lobbying forced it to go slightly beyond that aim. E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, LEGAL
[Vol. 22520
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television and data processing are prime examples of technol-
ogy that the old law was unable to treat effectively." The old
law was premised on the principle that the author should have
exclusive right to make reproductions of his work. The new
act espouses a new form of the traditional misappropriation
doctrine: the owner has the exclusive right to the commercial
exploitation of his work. 5
In Weisberg v. United States a private party sought ac-
cess to photographs in the possession of the FBI." The photo-
graphs related to the assassination of Reverend Martin Lu-
ther King and were the property of Time, Inc. Time held a
copyright on the photographs and had previously been unwill-
ing to share the contents of the photographs with Weisberg
unless Weisberg paid a reproduction fee which Weisberg con-
sidered exorbitant.5 7
In Weisberg the government argued that the Copyright
Act was an exemption three statute." It based its claim on
section 106 of the Copyright Act which provides in part:
Subject to Sections 107 through 118, the owner of copy-
right under the title has the exclusive rights to do and to
authorize any of the following:
1) To reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords;
3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copy-
righted work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease or lending ......
The government contended this language prevented the FBI
from reproducing or distributing the photographs to Weis-
berg. 0 It argued that the terms of this section are sufficiently
REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 622-23 (2d ed. 1979).
54. See generally Braunstein, Economics of Property Rights as Applied to
Computer Software and Data Bases, in COPYRIGHT, CONGRESS AND TECHNOLOGY: THE
PUBLISHED RECORD (N. Henry ed. 1980).
55. E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 53, at 622.
56. Weisberg v. United States Dep't of Justice, 631 F.2d 824, 825 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
57. Id. Time did not seek to prevent disclosure, but rather the government did
ostensibly act in Time's best interest. Presumably the government did not wish to
discourage parties such as Time from sharing such information in the future.
58. Brief for Appellant at 25-39, Weisberg v. United States Dep't of Justice, 631
F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
59. 17 U.S.C. app. § 106 (1976).
60. Brief for Appellant at 31, Weisberg v. United States Dep't of Justice, 631
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specific to qualify as an exemption three statute under subsec-
tion A.
The government also looked at the fair use provisions of
the Copyright Act e" and concluded that the four factors enu-
merated therein constituted the required "particular criteria"
needed to qualify under subsection B. 2 The court of appeals
did not rule directly on these arguments, but instead merely
quoted the district court's finding that the Copyright Act fails
to meet the requirements of either subsection of exemption
three." The court of appeals appeared to grant tacit approval
to what it considered an obvious conclusion."
Nothing in the language of the Copyright Act requires ei-
ther nondisclosure or secrecy. Applying the judicial analyses
of exemption three statutes surveyed above, the language of
section 108 clearly does not provide sufficiently specific stan-
dards to circumscribe administrative discretion which would
thereby enable the Copyright Act to fall within either of the
subsections of exemption three.
III. THE FOIA AND FAIR USE-A COLLISION COURSE
A. Introduction
In Weisberg the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia determined that the Copyright Act is not concerned
with nondisclosure or secrecy.6 Nevertheless, certain issues
that are easily resolved under the Copyright Act become more
complex or unusual when analyzed under the FOIA. Among
these issues are: reproduction, the charge for reproduction,
who should be assessed that charge, whether royalties should
be awarded, and who is liable for infringement if a court later
determines that the reproduction did not constitute fair use.
These problems, compounded by the procedures of the FOIA,
F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
61. Id. at 33.
62. Id. at 38.
63. 631 F.2d at 826.
64. Id. at 831. The court remanded for compulsory joinder of Time, the copy-
right holder. Although the court explicitly rejected ruling on the more sensitive spe-
cific factual issues of the case, it made plain its inclination towards Weisberg's posi-
tion. The case was eventually settled in favor of Weisberg. Correspondence from
Michael Kimmel, Attorney, Department of Justice, December 3, 1980 (on file at the
Santa Clara Law Review).
65. See infra note 91. These areas may be significant areas of concern under the
Rules and Regulations of Copyright Office, 37 C.F.R., Chapter 11 (1981).
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arise exclusively under the copyright statute because it is the
only statute specifically concerned with reproduction of docu-
ments and the costs of reproducing such documents.6
The FOIA provides that, where disclosure is authorized,
copying shall be performed by the government at a nominal
charge.6 7 The language and legislative history of the FOIA
suggest that the right to copy was provided solely to enhance
the underlying right to inspect.66
B. Fair Use in the Library Context Before the New Copy-
right Act-Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States
The economics of photocopying is related to the larger
problems of the economics of fair use and copyright protec-
tion.69 Although it was decided before the enactment of the
1976 Act, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States70 remains
the most influential case in this area. Williams & Wilkins Co.
involved the photocopying and dissemination of articles origi-
nally appearing in academic journals published by Williams &
Wilkins Co. The National Institute of Health and the Na-
tional Medical Library photocopied the articles upon request
from private parties. The Court held that defendants had not
infringed because they satisfactorily demonstrated that their
acts fell under the fair use doctrine.7 1 The Court of Claims
reasoned that Williams & Wilkins Co. did not demonstrate
sufficient harm to its business, 2 that medical knowledge
would be impeded were the photocopying and distribution in
question disallowed and that a legislative resolution was im-
minent. Therefore, the court determined that it should defer
66. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
67. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (1976).
68. Note, The Definition of "Agency Records" Under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1093 (1979). "[Tlhe right to copy. . . is supplemental to
the right to inspect and makes the latter meaningful." Id. at 1097 n.18 (quoting SuB-
COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 93RD CONG., 2D SEss., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCE BOOK: LEGIS-
LATIVE MATERIALS, CASES, ARTICLES at 42).
69. See, e.g., L. SELTZER, EXEMPTION AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT, 89-119 (1978).
70. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affd by equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376
(1975). For an excellent and thorough analysis of the case and its historical context
see Perlman & Rhinelander, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States: Photocopying,
Copyright and the Judicial Process, 1975 SuP. CT. REV. 355.
71. 487 F.2d at 1362.
72. Id. at 1357-59.
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to Congress rather than propose a novel judicial resolution."
C. The 1976 Copyright Act as a Codification of the Fair Use
Doctrine
The legislative resolution came soon thereafter in the
form of the Copyright Act of 1976. Nevertheless, the Act's fair
use provision, section 107, adopted the judicially developed
formulation of the doctrine.' In other words, no legislative
resolution was made. In the analysis of one commentator,
Congress attempted to balance copyright protection with the
need for dissemination of knowledge which, in effect, left the
current library practices unchanged.7 5
Historically, the copyright laws provided for fair use. 76
Congress codified specific exemptions that authorize one per-
son to copy another's work." Each exemption embodies a
public policy that a certain group or activity deserves special
treatment under the Copyright Act. These exemptions were
created to deal with situations not traditionally included
within the fair use doctrine. The free use of copyrighted
materials for nonprofit educational institutions is among these
exemptions.78 In the 1976 Act, Congress revised the scheme by
blurring the distinction between these exemptions and the
traditional doctrine of fair use.7 9 This concept is crucial in
considering proposals for facilitating the application of the
fair use doctrine in a special context, such as the FOIA.
D. The FOIA in the Library Context-SDC Development
73. Id. at 1360-61.
74. Section 198, however, sets out more specific rules for photocopying in the
library context. See Pegram, Photocopying in Profit Oriented Organizations Under
the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 34 Bus. LAw 1251, 1277-79 (1979).
75. Id. at 1282. Another commentator has emphasized that Congress had at
least considered developing more specific criteria for fair use and had explored the
possible concomitant effects on the underlying economic rationale of fair use in the
photocopyng context. L. SELTZER, supra note 69, at 50.
76. See L. SELTZER, supra note 69.
77. 17 U.S.C. app. § 110 (1976).
78. Id.
79. Conversation with Leon Seltzer, Esq., Stanford, California, January 30,
1981. Seltzer contends that Congress must eventually rectify its errors. The Act itself
provides that section 107 must be re-evaluated after a five-year trial period. 17 U.S.C.
app. § 107 (1976).
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Corp. v. Mathews
Many of the difficult photocopying issues now before the
court involve the library setting. Both private and public li-
braries participate in interlibrary loan programs that require
extensive photocopying of materials. In these and other cir-
cumstances, librarians may find themselves copying materials
without knowing the identity of the person to receive the
materials or the motives for requesting duplication of the
materials. In addition, libraries encourage photocopying in or-
der to minimize both the lending and the theft of materials.80
The issue of whether undue advantage should be taken of
the FOIA in order to avoid copying costs arose in SDC Devel-
opment Corp. v. Mathews.81 The private parties in that case
sought access to a computerized medical information system
developed and administered by the National Library of
Medicine. Rather than pay the annual subscription fee and
concomitant hourly rate for access to this data bank,"2 SDC
Development Corp. requested the information under the
FOIA. The case presented two threshold issues: first, whether
the National Library was an "agency" as defined by the
FOIA," and second, whether this data bank constituted
"records" as defined by the FOIA.84 The case was not decided
on either of these grounds; instead the court looked to issues
of equity and public policy:
The agency is seeking to protect not its information, but
rather its system for delivering that information ....
Requiring the agency to make its delivery system availa-
ble to the appellants at nominal charge would not en-
hance the information gathering and dissemination func-
tion of the agency, but rather would hamper it
substantially.88
Economic factors relating to the proper functioning of the
agency would not permit the government to release the
80. See Pegram, supra note 74.
81. 542 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1976).
82. The data bank is called MEDLARS (for Medical Literature Analysis and
Retrieval System).
83. The issue of what constitutes an agency record was also the "threshold"
issue in Weisberg according to the Court of Appeals. 631 F.2d at 827.
84. See generally Note, Agency Records, supra note 68.
85. 542 F.2d at 1120. The court looked to statutory language and legislative
history in reaching its conclusion.
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"agency records." The court determined that to permit access
to the documents by means of the FOIA would completely un-
dermine the otherwise viable system used by the National Li-
brary. The fact that the library's system set arbitrary prices
and permitted various exceptions did not dissuade the court
from finding that SDC was attempting to circumvent a valid
procedure for obtaining the information.
The interrelationship of access and price is the crux of
the problem confronting courts in cases like Weisberg and
SDC Development Corp. In Weisberg the court easily distin-
guished SDC Development Corp. on its facts. The court held
that in Weisberg "the requested materials plainly 'reflect the
• ..operation, or decision-making functions of the agency,'
because they will permit evaluation of the FBI's performance
in investigating the King assassination." 86
In SDC Development Corp. the court looked to econom-
ics, Congressional intent, and public policy in making its de-
termination. It did not directly consider the formal judicial
doctrine of fair use.87 SDC's use clearly would not qualify
under that doctrine. In contrast, Weisberg proclaimed a schol-
arly and totally noncommercial purpose.88 Nevertheless, what
would be the result if Weisberg were to decide that he would
like to exploit some commercial advantage he has obtained
from his research? 89 Or suppose his research would not con-
tribute to an increase in public knowledge? How should a
court decide these issues in advance? Under the present
scheme these questions are not satisfactorily answered.
86. 631 F.2d at 828 (quoting SDC Dev. Corp.).
87. The new Copyright Act had not yet been enacted.
88. The code itself offers examples of fair use: "criticism, comment, new report-
ing, teaching ..., scholarship or research .... " 17 U.S.C. app. § 197 (1976). Cir-
cumstances similar to Weisberg involving parallel issues regarding fair use were
before the court in Time v. Bernard Geis, 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). At issue
there was the use, in a commercially available book of photos derived from the frames
of a copyrighted film depicting actual events surrounding the assassination of Presi-
dent Kennedy. The court upheld the defendant's right to copy the frames because of
the public interest in the murder of a president. The court merely implied that a
balancing approach based on customary fair use principles provided guidance in
reaching its conclusion.
Motive has posed a more difficult problem in the context of exemption four. See
infra note 102 and accompanying text.
89. A similar problem in FOIA litigation has given rise to the "Public Benefit"
test. Bonine, supra note 35, at 238-46 (discussing the "Public Benefit" test in the
FOIA context).
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IV. RECONCILING FAIR USE AND THE FOIA
A. Public Policy Versus an Economic Structure
The solution to the fair use problem, as it relates to ac-
cess of information generally, lies in reconciling economic fac-
tors with public policy concerns, most importantly the first
amendment."0 As isolated in Weisberg, the fair use issue is
easily resolved by relying on both the traditional concept of
scholarly research and on the public policy of access to gov-
ernment operations under the FOIA. This "denial of access"
use of copyright has not previously been used openly. The
concept used by the government in Weisberg, however, is not
totally novel. How it will be used in the future is uncertain.91
90. One author has argued for a more pronounced primacy of the first amend-
ment over the Copyright Act. Rosenfield, The American Constitution, Free Inquiry
and the Law, in FAIR USE AND FREE INQUIRY 287 (J. Lawrence & B. Timberg eds.
1980).
Apparently an author's political perspective strongly influences his views on this
issue. Another author feels that copyright and the First Amendment are following
"parallel routes to similar destinations", but that courts do not generally recognize
this. Timberg, A Modernized Fair Use Code for the Electronic as Well as the
Gutenberg Age, 75 Nw. U.L. REV., 193 (1980).
For further discussion of the first amendment/copyright issue, see Goldstein,
Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970); Nimmer, Does
Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1180 (1970).
91. One group of researchers asserts that copyright could be used to suppress
information. Breslow, Ferguson & Haverkampt, An Analysis of Computer and Photo-
copying Copyright Issues From the Point of View of the General Public and the
Ultimate Consumer, in 4 COPYRIGHT CONGRESS AND TECHNOLOGY: THE PUBLIC RE-
CORD 134 (N. Henry ed. 1980). The group is aware of "no way of systematically ex-
ploring whether such use of copyright is substantial or is likely to become so in the
future." Id.
Under the new Act, registration (or deposit for that matter) is not a prerequisite
for obtaining a valid copyright. 17 U.S.C. app. § 408(a) (1976). In contrast to the old
law, all that is now required for an effective copyright is that the work be set in a
fixed tangible medium. 17 U.S.C. app. § 102(a) (1976). The concept of the "copy-
right" as personal property appears to place a greater emphasis on its privacy compo-
nent. Various provisions that encourage prompt registration and possible deposit,
however, restrict this tendency. For example, a suit for copyright infringement cannot
be brought until the work has been registered with the Copyright Office. 17 U.S.C.
app. § 205(d) (1976). For a detailed summary of the advantages of coypright registra-
tion, see H. HENN, COPYRIGHT PRIMER, 69-73 (1979). In deciding whether to register or
deposit works with the government, these advantages must be balanced with the re-
linquishment of confidentiality. The Copyright Office does not require that all mater-
ials be deposited and has outlined categories not requiring deposit. 37 C.F.R. §
202.19(c) (1981).
It is also possible that certain standardized tests be categorized "secure test,"
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B. Balancing Economic Factors in Fair Use
Most commentators consider the economic loss criterion
listed in Section 107,92 of paramount importance.9 Reliance
on economic loss in determining infringement, however, does
not resolve the fair use cases.' This is due in part to the diffi-
culty of assessing present and potential losses resulting from
an infringement. How far into the future should a court look
in anticipating a potential loss? The issue of the scope of po-
tential markets, as an aspect of economic loss, must be bal-
anced against the public's interest in the creation of new
works." The issue is intensified when the parties are dealing
with one another through an intermediary. The FOIA context
requires the government to be this intermediary.
section 108 is Congress' attempt to account for the librar-
ies' frequent intermediary role as photocopiers. According to
one commentator, section 108 puts the courts back into the
"access" and "price control" business.6 In any event, Section
108(f)(4) applies where the library or archives independently
develops a contractual royalty-type arrangement with the cop-
yright owner. This is one step towards eliminating the "inter-
mediary" problem. Such an arrangement is a market-deter-
mined economic mechanism wholly within the dynamics of
the copyright scheme.' It has also been proposed that the
copyright laws should require procedures for negotiated agree-
ments that will take a cost-benefit approach in resolving fair
thereby enabling the party to substitute summaries or samples of the tests without
leaving the text in the possession of the Copyright Office. The status of these tests
has recently been a source of controversy. See, e.g., Association of Am. Colleges v.
Carey, 482 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D.N.Y. 1980); National Conf. of Bar Examiners v. Multi-
state Legal Studies, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. 11. 1980). The reason these testing
agencies have sought copyright is not to preserve the strict confidentiality of their
tests, but rather to guard against infringement. It would appear that these special
rules should not serve to bring copyright within the guidelines of exemption three
requirements for nondisclosure.
92. See supra note 7.
93. See, e.g., SELTZER, supra note 69, at 12.
94. Perlman & Rhinelander, supra note 70, at 393. Seltzer discusses the reasons
why microeconomic theory is not effective in analyzing the publishing industry. SELT-
ZER, supra note 69, at 6 n.20.
95. Perlman & Rhinelander, supra note 70, at 393. The public interest in ac-
cess, the main issue in Weisberg, should probably also be weighed.
96. SELTZER supra note 69, at 90.
97. Id. at 96. In Weisberg, Time was initially unwilling to provide the photo-
graphs when confronted directly by Weisberg.
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use issues." This is close to a compulsory licensing scheme
that would require as complete an accountability as possible.99
C. The Importance of Exemption Four Case Law in Propos-
als for Improving the FOIA
Much of the controversy regarding the government's role
as repository of the information of private parties vis-a-vis the
FOIA has centered on exemption four.100 As a result, propos-
als for improving the system have been discussed almost ex-
clusively in the context of that exemption.101 Agencies and
courts have been sensitive to the impairment of the govern-
ment's ability to collect and organize data from private par-
ties.102 Considering the inevitable economic consequences, it is
in the government's interest to assert its right to private infor-
mation.103 Although clearly in the government's interest, it
may be detrimental to the private sector which might be more
reluctant to develop new information. 10 Perhaps some limited
98. Id.
99. Timberg, supra note 90, at 241-43. The author encourages a broader appli-
cation of fair use in general. Id. at 244.
100. SELTZER, supra note 69, at 119. Seltzer concludes that a new statutory so-
lution is not required; the government should either abandon any attempt to regulate
this photocopying process and allow individuals to devise private contracts or, as in
Europe, control the system completely by monitoring such "fair use" by imposing
taxes on machines or libraries. Conversation with Leon Seltzer, Esq., Stanford, Cali-
fornia, January 30, 1981.
101. See, e.g., Vladeck & Lynch, Exemption (b)(4)-Trade Secrets, and Camp-
bell, Reverse Freedom of Information Act Litigation, in 1981 FOIA LITIGATION supra
note 24.
Exemption four states that the FOIA does not apply to matters that are trade
secrets, or to commercial or financial information obtained from a person that is priv-
ileged or confidential. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976).
102. See, e.g., National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (requiring an objective showing of specific harm). See generally
Greenawalt & Noam, Confidentiality Claims of Business Organizations, in BUSINESS
DISCLOSURE: GOVERNMENT'S NEED TO KNOW (H. Goldschmid ed. 1979).
The scope of the so-called "Reverse-FOIA" suits has been changed drastically
since Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979). Chrysler held that although infor-
mation falls within an FOIA exemption, it may nevertheless be disclosed at the
agency's discretion. Because the FOIA exemptions are only permissive the submitter
has no power under the FOIA to sue the agency. Id. at 290-94. However, the submit-
ter can seek redress under provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §
702 (1976). For an excellent analysis of the implications of Chrysler, see Note, Pro-
tecting Confidential Corp. v. Brown, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 109 (1980).
103. Greenawalt & Noam, supra note 102, at 412.
104. Id. in 1976, the Food and Drug Administration said that since major revi-
sions were made in the FOIA in 1974, 90 percent of its FOIA requests had come from
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protection for information could be developed similar to the
protection afforded patents, in order to increase incentives for
the development of such information.10'
D. Critique of Current Proposals
Several significant, but primarily academic, ideas for re-
structuring the public information system have been proposed
in the context of exemption four. ' 06 The potential impact of
these proposals on the copyright scheme and its interaction
with the FOIA will be considered.
One comprehensive proposal has as its goal citizen educa-
tion.1  That proposal is unfortunately premised on the dubi-
ous ground that agencies are willing to comply with the re-
quirements of the FOIA without judicial review. It proposes
the establishment of agency "libraries" for cataloging infor-
mation.108 That proposal is not very different from the present
scheme of bureaucratic file systems. It points up the overlap
between an ordinary general public library's function as
lender of books (and information) and the government and its
agencies to assume the role of such a "public" library from
which an informed public can "borrow" information.109 In
such a situation, does the Copyright Act's section 108, as a
means to a workable solution to the entire "library-photo-
companies in the drug industry seeking data provided to the agency by other compa-
nies. R. STEVENSON, JR., CORPORATIONS AND INFORMATION-SECRECY, ACCESS AND Dis-
CLOSURE, 177 (1980).
105. Greenawalt & Noam, supra note 102, at 412. There would likely be opposi-
tion under the first amendment. At the present time copyright protection is not even
permitted for any publication written by government researchers. 17 U.S.C. app. §
105 (1976).
The theories and principles underlying copyright law differ in certain respects
from those of patent law, although both are forms of intellectual property protection.
HENN, supra note 91, at 2. The material protected, however, is quite distinct: patent
law protects ideas while copyright only protects the expression of ideas. Patents are
often used in business to protect plans that might otherwise be exploited by competi-
tors. Id.
106. See A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY (1971); Koch & Rubin, A Propo-
sal for a Comprehensive Restucturing of The Public Information System, 1979 DuKE
L. J. 1 [hereinafter Koch & Rubin]; Note, The Freedom of Nonfree Information: An
Economic Proposal for Government Disclosure of Privately Submitted Commercial
Information, 32 STAN. L. REV. 339.
107. Koch & Rubin, supra note 106, at 33.
108. Id. at 42.
109. For an example of such a system, see SDC Dev. Corp. v. Mathews, 542
F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1976).
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copying" controversy, control over the' systematized proce-
dures of the FOJA and the Administrative Procedure Act? Ac-
cording to the Ninth Circuit in SDC Development Corp., the
underlying equity interests that gave rise to sections 107 and
108 of the Copyright Act will govern the outcome of any
case.110 Accordingly, the current system for balancing interests
is inadequate.'The government should release only the infor-
mation necessary for citizen education of agency perform-
ance." 2 This approach reserves the most crucial aspect of de-
cision-making to the courts. The legislature, however, should
have a greater voice than these authors are willing to allocate.
Nevertheless, under this proposal, each individual agency
would develop its own system.'13 Critics of the FOIA assert
that this has already happened and that the public is thereby
encountering new obstacles in its quest for more government
access."1  Under this first proposal, administrative enforce-
110. Id. at 1120.
111. Koch & Rubin, supra note 106, at 50.
112. Id. at 55. This is a reformulation of the issue in Weisberg that neither the
district nor the appeals court had any difficulty deciding. Judicial discretion served as
the ultimate arbiter. The authors state in this regard: "Private information that finds
its way into government files-whether through actual compulsion, the submitter's
self-interest or voluntary submission-does not serve this purpose and need not be
released." Id.
113. Id. at 56-57. A more realistic look at the present structure of administra-
tive procedure as a foundation for improvement is found in Note, supra note 102, at
132-35.
Like other government agencies, the Copyright Office has established its own pol-
icies and procedures in order to respond efficiently to requests under the FOIA. 37
C.F.R. § 203. Thus, the Copyright Office "makes available for public inspection and
copying records of copyright registrations and of final refusals to register claims to
copyright" 37 C.F.R. § 203.4(a). There also exists a Supervisory Copyright Informa-
tion Specialist who is responsible for responding to all initial requests submitted
under the FOIA. 37 C.F.R. § 203.4(d).
In Weisberg, the plaintiff directed his request to the FBI. The plaintiff would
probably have been unsuccessful in directing his request to the Copyright Office, had
it possessed the photographs, because the photographs would not have met the test
set forth in SDC Dev. Corp. v. Matthews, 542 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1976). SDC Dev.
Corp. required that the requested document genuinely reflect the agency's
performance.
However, the court in Irons & Sears v. Dann, 606 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir.) cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1975 (1979), did not apply this strict standard in permitting disclo-
sure of patent applications under FOIA. There have not been any cases litigated in-
volving the Copyright Office.
114. See Ranii, Battling the FOIA Tangle, NAT'L L.J., May 4, 1981, at 1. col. 1;
Bonine, supra note 35. Bonine also makes some interesting recommendations for
bringing uniformity to the agencies' task of determining who should pay how much
for searching and duplicating agency records under the FOIA. Id. at 257-66.
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ment is deemed more effective than judicial enforcement." 5
The authors of the proposal consider the present public infor-
mation system a failure because it does not serve the public
interest and does not effectively disseminate information.'
They recommend that a separate agency administer the pub-
lic information system.17 In view of the complexities of coor-
dinating the new developments brought on by new technol-
ogy, this proposal must be seriously considered only if it can
bring together experts equipped to deal with the problems. At
this point the proposal appears unrealistic because it ignores
the political and economic problems such a system would
encounter." 8
A second proposal emphasizes governmental access based
on a rationale that follows not from a concern for a more open
government, but rather "from an economic analysis of the
proper role for government in the dissemination of private in-
formation."" 9 The granting of any property interest in infor-
mation is viewed as a potential source of inefficiency.2 0
Therefore, a governmental mechanism should be established
to contribute to submitters of private information the differ-
ence between their loss and the requestor's gain. This would
theoretically insure the submitters against additional losses
from misuse of their documents. 2' Such a system would force
the government to assume the role of a "Copyright Clearance
Center" under the FOIA.122 It is not surprising that the gov-
ernment has been reluctant to assume such an onerous
responsibility.'
Under this plan, an agency mechanism would determine
115. Koch & Rubin, supra note 106, at 58.
116. Id. at 59.
117. Id. at 58.
118. A subcommittee staff member at the 1980 Congressional hearings on the
FOIA notes that a centralized "Information Czar" had been considered but is an un-
likely possibility because of its "Big Brother implications." Lawscope, 67 A.B.A. J.
146 (1981). Professor Miller has observed that the Congressional idea for an "infor-
mation policy" dates back to 1969. MILLER, supra note 106, at 248.
119. Note, Nonfree Information supra note 106, at 346. The author sees the
FOIA procedures as circumventing the regular market process.
120. Id. at 348 n.57. He further analyzes other forces at work in such a transac-
tion, such as privacy interests. Id.
121. Id. at 371.
122. The author envisions such a system as increasing equity and efficiency, but
it is impossible to verify such a hypothesis.
123. The Royalty Tribunal authorized by 17 U.S.C. app. § 801(a) (1976), which
sets royalty for Cable Television users, is a limited form of such a system.
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whether efficiency warranted the disclosure of a given docu-
ment.124 The agency could provide for nondisclosure if the
benefits of disclosure to a competitor do not exceed the costs
involved. The courts essentially use that procedure now
under the test set forth in National Parks & Conservation
Association v. Morton.'25 The ultimate goal of the agency
would be efficiency and equity." 6
This plan is a more sophisticated version, in terms of its
economic analysis, than the 1971 idea of Professor Arthur
Miller which called for greater efficiency under the FOIA.127
Further sophisticated economic analysis is required, however,
before the government can venture into these uncharted wa-
ters of market control of public information dissemination.
The role of copyright in this overall framework is potentially
overwhelming. 2 ' One commentator has even predicted that
the copyright law will eventually determine patterns of
knowledge.' 29
E. Licensing & Fair Use-An Alternative Proposal
As the amount of information stored by the government
increases, the government will assume a greater role in dealing
with the information. What is less obvious is that the private
sector's role in this process must also increase accordingly as
it interacts more extensively with the government. The Na-
tional Library system (from the Library of Congress to local
libraries) is a part of various governments. Many of the docu-
ments in these libraries are copyrighted. The documents, how-
ever, are open to public noncommercial interests by means of
the fair use doctrine. 30
The disclosure principles of the FOIA ignore copyright is-
sues to the extent that distinctly commercial interests are not
124. Note, Nonfree Information supra note 106, at 355. The author concedes
that such economic analysis would be difficult, but no more difficult than a judge's
task in assessing damages in a libel case. Id. at 360 n.87.
125. 498 F.3d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
126. Note, Nonfree Information, supra note 106, at 361.
127. MILLER, supra note 106, at 243-72.
128. N. HENRY, COPYRIGHT, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, PUBLIC POLICY, PART I:
COPYRIGHT-PUBLIC POLICIES (1975). Henry sees the Copyright Act as broader in
scope than the FOIA because it is a constitutional principle with "awesome" applica-
tion to public policy as it relates to public knowledge. Id. at 17.
129. Id. at 54-76.
130. See supra notes 6, 7 & 88 and accompanying text.
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at stake. This is but. another way of postulating that the Cop-
yright Act cannot qualify as an exemption three statute under
the FOIA. Commercial interests are protected under the
FOIA if the "privileged," "confidential," and "business" re-
quirements of exemption four are satisfied. Even then, the
copyright issue becomes peripheral.
By changing the nature of the application of fair use in'
the library photocopying context, Congress has the power to
significantly alter the nature of copyright. For example, a
compulsory licensing system would prevent would-be "fair
users" from making use of the copyrighted materials.13 1 A
compulsory licensing system could be avoided by providing an
adminstrative hearing to determine the commercial conse-
quences of the second party's use. In the FOIA context, such a
system has broad implications for any government agency act-
ing as a library on behalf of a party seeking copies. Copyright
principles, set forth in the Constitution,1 82 are more pervasive;
any major reform in the area where these two systems overlap
must first occur in the copyright sphere. This does not mean
that the FOIA cannot be improved until the copyright law is
altered. It does mean that changes in the FOIA based on the
economics of information3 3 as applied to confidential business
information or trade secrets cannot be applied in the copy-
right context until the copyright scheme, and fair use in par-
ticular, undergoes drastic reform that more adequately con-
siders the underlying economic aspects of the copyright
system. Until such changes are effectuated copyright will play
an increasingly important role in the context of FOIA
litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
Copyrighted documents are not to be denied to a FOIA
requestor under either exemption three or exemption four.
The Copyright Act is clearly not a nondisclosure statute under
the three criteria in exemption three. Nevertheless, a copy-
right is significant in determining the fairest procedure in the
interests of all the parties involved. Whether other factors
131. See Timberg, supra note 90, for a convincing rationale for such an
approach.
132. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
133. See notes 92-95 & 119-26 supra.
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deemed significant by Congress or the courts will prevent dis-
closure pursuant to a request will be determined by the facts
of the individual case.
The fair use doctrine of the Copyright Act of 1976 and
exemption three of the Freedom of Information Act now ac-
count for the merging of underlying policies of the two stat-
utes. The two Acts equip the courts with a basic approach to a
resolution of the major issue in Weisberg-an issue that may
arise in the future. Technology, the greater need for efficiency,
and public awareness will force Congress to dig more deeply
into the underlying policies and practical functionings of these
statutes in order to resolve issues under the two Acts. The ul-
timate result will be a greater sensitivity to the needs that
both statutes serve-fairness in the access to and dissemina-
tion of information.
The unique problem presented in Weisberg underscores
the larger problem of access and dissemination. As the areas
of copyright and access to information increasingly overlap,
the financial or practical rewards will become more significant,
and it will be incumbent upon Congress to respond to this
challenge. For meaningful reform to occur, both statutes
must be adjusted to better account for their respective under-
lying social and economic consequences. The main achieve-
ment of Weisberg and SDC Development Corp. is in empha-
sizing the interdependence of the two statutory systems. For
the moment, the application of judicial principles of equity
within the present statutory framework will suffice, but the
potential for inconsistency and inequality is great.
Roy Seth Gordet*
* This comment was awarded first prize at the University of Santa Clara School
of Law 1981 Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition sponsored by the American Soci-
ety of Composers, Authors & Publishers.
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